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When Voters Make Laws:  How Direct Democracy is Shaping American 
Cities 
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City, county and municipal ballot propositions are often used to raise funds for 
new infrastructure projects.  Although scholars have extensively studied statewide 
initiatives,1 local ballot measures have not received nearly as much academic attention.2  
In this paper we discuss three challenges facing the use the initiative and referendum 
process to fund local infrastructure projects; these problems suggest that we cannot be 
confident that voters have been able to make decisions that best serve their interests.  We 
do not conclude that such difficulties are necessarily fatal to the use of direct democracy 
to determine funding for infrastructure investment, but our analysis has consequences for 
the regulatory structure that shapes this process in cities, counties and special districts. 
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POL. SCI., 463 (2004). 
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First, Romer and Rosenthal have showed how public agencies, such as local 
hospital or school districts, can make “take-it-or-leave-it” offers to voter that may leave 
them with a Hobson’s choice, for example, between overcrowded schools or hospitals 
and a new bond measure.3  Voters do not have the ability to amend a bond proposal to 
move it closer to their preferences; they face a binary choice between either the status 
quo or the particular bond on the ballot.  Accordingly, such decision making confers 
substantial power on the agenda setter.  This problem plagues direct democracy at the 
state level, as well as at the local level, but we fear that it may be exacerbated by low 
voter turnout that characterizes many purely local elections in which bond measures are 
decided. 
Second, Kousser and McCubbins have identified several common social choice 
problems that arise when sophisticated political actors manipulate the initiative agenda.4  
One of the most pernicious is that of sequential elimination agendas:  alternatives are 
offered one at a time, in a sequence.5  The core problem with sequential elimination 
agendas is that they do not allow citizens to compare directly all of the alternatives and, 
therefore, do not allow them to make tradeoffs among their options.  We illustrate this 
decision-making pathology by providing descriptions of a plethora of targeted bond 
measures that have faced voters in Austin, Texas, throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
The typical problems created by sequential elimination agendas, suffered by state-
level initiatives as well as local ballot propositions, are further compounded by two 
                                                                                                                                            
LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA (2004). 
3 Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 
PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978). 
4 Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy Making by Direct Democracy, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005). 
5 Peter C. Ordeshook & Thomas Schwartz, Agenda and the Control of Political Outcomes, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 179 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1060861 
Garrett/McCubbins 
When Voters Make Laws 
 
 3 
related aspects of local bond measures:  1) limits on bond capacity created by state law, 
bond rating agencies or voters’ (un)willingness to be taxed; and 2) the presence of 
overlapping governmental authorities that can each propose bond measures to voters.  A 
voter may be under the tax authorities of a city, county, school district, other special 
district such as a water district, and in California, one or more community facilities 
districts.  If there is also an aggregate limit on the amount of taxes that can be raised – 
whether the limit is imposed by the state, generated by the bond-rating agencies and the 
bond market, or enforced by voters’ unwillingness to pay higher taxes – then the various 
overlapping taxing authorities have an incentive to be the first mover in securing tax 
revenue, whether or not there is a specific need for the money at the time. 
In short, this institutional setting creates the conditions for a “race to the polls” by 
government entities that seek to secure funding for their projects before the limit on 
funding is reached.  The race for tax revenue can create a situation in which bonds cannot 
be passed when they are needed; instead, funding is already allocated to unneeded or 
unwanted projects that were approved at an earlier election (i.e., earlier in the agenda).  
At the very least, this attenuates the connection between raising taxes and the need to use 
tax revenue.  This disconnect may also help to explain why governments ask for more 
bonding authority than they issue; by doing so, they guarantee the availability of bond 
revenue if taxpayers refuse to fund projects at some point in the future.  
Third, we find that voters can be faced with an information environment that 
precludes their making reasoned choices at the ballot box.  The Progressives, who 
originally supported bond initiatives as a means of self-government, relied on a faith in 
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reason:  they believed that when presented with reasons for a bond proposal or other 
referendum, voters could choose the proper course of action based on the persuasiveness 
of the different appeals.  Indeed, most states require arguments for and against ballot 
measures be presented in the official voter’s guide, which may also include analyses by 
nonpartisan public officials.  The presence of reasons is intended to allow voters to 
determine whether they should support or oppose a particular bond measure based on 
their understanding of the merits of the arguments. 
For voters to make a reasoned choice that can improve their welfare, however, 
they must have correct beliefs about the consequences of their vote.6  Occasionally, 
voters may be able to identify the consequences of their vote on the basis of personal 
knowledge and experience, but they usually lack such information.  In that case, voters 
must be able to learn from someone else – a knowledgeable, trustworthy endorser.  They 
can then cast a reasoned vote, not depending on their own encyclopedic knowledge of a 
policy or their independent assessment of the merits of the argument, but using reliable 
cues provided by a knowledgeable, trusted endorser.  If both personal knowledge and 
reliable endorsers are absent, however, then it is unlikely that voters can consistently 
make welfare-improving choices.7  In a series of case studies from Los Angeles and San 
Francisco, we find very mixed information environments for local bond measures, some 
which may allow voters to learn about the consequences of their decisions through 
trustworthy endorsements from ballot pamphlets or newspaper articles and editorials, and 
                                                
6 Following ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA:  CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT 
THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998), we analyze whether the information environment enables voters to make decisions that 
improve their individual welfare.  We do not consider the effect of these bond propositions on social welfare because 
that is a notoriously tricky subject that is difficult to investigate. 
7 In evaluating the information environment that confronts voters, we are mostly concerned with the focus on 
statements by a knowledgeable, trusted speaker.  Calvert argues that the basic nature of any speaker’s advice is a 
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others in which those important voting cues are few or nonexistent.  Although these case 
studies provide only anecdotal evidence of the robustness of the information environment 
for bond measures generally, they suggest that we cannot be confident that voters are 
equipped to make decisions consistent with their interests.  On the other hand, some of 
the examples give rise to guarded optimism that people do sometimes have access to 
sufficient information to cast informed votes. 
Our aim in this paper is mainly a descriptive one.  We seek to understand these 
three problems in the context of local bond measures.  They are not unique to the local 
context; indeed, all of them affect state-level initiatives and referendums, although we 
identify some aspects of the challenges that may be particularly acute at the local level.  
With a better understanding of the local dynamics of direct democracy, scholars can then 
begin to craft reform proposals to ameliorate these pathologies or to ensure that voters 
have better access to necessary information such as trustworthy endorsements.  In other 
work,8 we have proposed reforms directed to these problems at the state level; we are not 
convinced, however, that the same reforms would succeed at the city, county or special 
district levels.  Thus, we view this article as only a beginning; we hope it will be followed 
first by more descriptive work and then by suggestions to improve the process through 
which local bond measures are considered and adopted. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 1, we examine how bond initiatives 
can present voters with take-it-or-leave-it offers and the consequences of such offers.  In 
Section 2, we look at the presence of sequential elimination agendas within the context of 
                                                                                                                                            
“distillation of complex reality into a simple recommendation.”  Randall Calvert, The Value of Biased Information:  A 
Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. OF POL. 530, 534 (1985). 
8 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2007); Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct 
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multiple jurisdictions seeking to finance infrastructure.  In Section 3, we demonstrate 
why a faith in reason and argument is misplaced and elucidate the conditions that allow 
voters to learn about the effects of an initiative from trustworthy endorsers.  In section 4, 
we examine voter learning about bond propositions in Los Angeles at two different time 
periods.  Section 5 studies the information environment surrounding campaigns for 
modern infrastructure measures in San Francisco.  Finally, in Section 6, we conclude. 
1. A Hobson’s Choice for Voters 
 Although previous scholarship has found that direct democracy leads to outcomes 
preferred by the median voter, these models rely on the ability of multiple agenda setters 
to put forward competing proposals for voters to consider.9  However, in the local bond 
measure environment, the typical scenario is one in which there is a single agenda setter, 
and that entity is usually a government actor, like a school board or city council, that 
chooses to ask the voters to approve a bond.  Interested parties and voters lack the ability 
to amend or change the agenda setter’s proposal.  As such, this closely resembles the 
Romer and Rosenthal take-it-or-leave-it offers.10  They find that monopoly agenda 
control confers significant power on an agenda setter to move policy outcomes in its 
preferred direction.11 
To illustrate the point more clearly, consider the following figures.  In each figure, 
the pivotal voter’s preference is indicated by V; the status quo if the bond does not pass is 
indicated by Q; and the agency’s ideal point is presented by A.  The left side of the figure 
                                                                                                                                            
Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005). 
9 See GERBER, supra note 1, at 21-36; MATSUSAKA, supra note 1, at 128-45. 
10 Romer & Rosenthal, supra note 3. 
11 We focus on the pivotal voter because bond proposals in California require approval by a 2/3 majority to pass, except 
in the case of schools bonds where 55percent approval is required for passage.  See KIM S. RUEBEN & PEDRO CERDAN, 
FISCAL EFFECTS OF VOTER APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Chapter 2 (2003). 
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represents smaller government and lower taxes while the right side of the figure 
represents larger government and higher taxes.  The pivotal voter, V, will support policy 
change that is as close, or closer, to his ideal point as the status quo.  So in Figure 1 the 
voter will vote for any policy that is at least as close to his ideal point as Q, regardless of 
whether the new policy is to his left or right. 
 
Figure 1: Water Policy 
 
 
  
In Figure 1 we present a hypothetical case of a water policy agency that could 
propose a bond.  In this case the agency’s ideal point, A, lies at the edge of the area where 
the pivotal voter will approve policy.  Therefore, the agency can propose its ideal point, 
and the policy will pass with the pivotal voter’s support even though it does not move 
policy any closer to the pivotal voter’s ideal point.  However, the bond will move policy 
exactly to the agency’s ideal point. 
Q V A 
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Figure 2: School Policy 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 presents another hypothetical case in which the school district, 
represented by A, prefers a school bond far from the pivotal voter’s ideal point, V.  Here 
the agency cannot propose its own ideal point because the pivotal voter would not 
support a position farther from his preferred policy than the status quo.  However, the 
school district can propose R, at the limit of the voter’s preferences. 
This example shows how the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer allows the 
agency to move policy much closer to its preferred point than the status quo.  One 
consequence of the ability to control the agenda is that government size may be greater 
than that preferred by the pivotal voter.  In the examples above, the additional size of 
government relative to the pivotal voter’s preference is represented by (V1-A1) and (V2-
A2).  If we aggregate these (V1-A1) + (V2-A2), then we see that the combined size of 
government may be much larger than the pivotal voter prefers. 
 Local governments have another advantage that allows them a better chance of 
success at the polls.  Strategic political actors can wait to propose ballot measures until 
they will appear in an election where turnout is likely to result in an outcome that the 
proponents desire.   The timing of elections can be manipulated by political officials to 
increase their chances of success, even when supermajority votes are required to pass 
Q V R A 
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bonds.  Voter turnout differs significantly – both in size and character – depending on 
whether the local election occurs simultaneously with a national or state election and 
depending on which candidates and other ballot questions are on the same ballot.  In 
addition, participation on all matters presented at one election may fall off when the 
ballot is full of dozens of bond and other ballot measures; government officials can 
manipulate this aspect of elections to their benefit as well. 
Although turnout is a concern in all issue elections no matter the level of 
government, it may be more problematic in the purely local context because turnout can 
be extremely low even by U.S. standards.12  For example, if the bond is submitted to the 
people in a special election with few other issues on the ballot, then only those with 
intense preferences are likely to take the time to vote.  Similarly, only those with a special 
interest in a bond proposal may make the effort to find it among a list of dozens on a long 
ballot.  Supporters of the bond can work to minimize opposition so that participation in 
an election largely consists of those citizens who strongly support the bond.  Thus, two 
characteristics of some bond elections – supermajority voting requirements and skewed 
turnout – draw into question how accurately such votes reflect the views of the median 
voter or even the pivotal voter in a representative sample of all citizens. 
 Take-it-or-leave-it offers are not simply a theoretical concern in local bond 
propositions; the contemporary context of infrastructure bonds offers many real world 
examples.  Consider the circumstances surrounding several recent bond propositions in 
San Diego County.13  In November 2004, voters in seven communities of Northeast San 
                                                
12 Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38 URBAN AFFAIRS 
REV. 645 (2003). 
13 Information about San Diego elections can be found at http://www.smartvoter.org/ca/sd/. 
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Diego County approved Proposition BB, a general obligation bond of up to $496 million 
for hospital, emergency care, and trauma center improvements for the Palomar Pomerado 
Health System.  Proposition BB paid for most of a $753 million building plan by 
increasing property taxes over the next thirty years by about $17.75 a year for every 
$100,000 in assessed valuation.  Less than two years later, in June 2006, the Tri City 
Medical District (in Northwest San Diego County) proposed Proposition F, hiring the 
same political consultant who had handled the campaign for Proposition BB.  This ballot 
measure would have authorized up to $596 million in general obligation bonds to repair 
and improve its medical facilities.  However, Proposition F failed, and in 2006 a similar 
proposition in the same medical district, Proposition T, also failed.  The measure 
garnered about 65 percent support, but two-thirds support was needed.  Meanwhile, in the 
southeast corner of the county, the Grossmont Healthcare District won approval for 
Proposition G, which authorized a $247 million bond for hospital improvements. 
The strategic reaction of the Tri-City Medical District to its repeated failures to 
pass the hospital bonds is interesting.  The Tri City Medical District is considering 
redrawing the district boundaries to include some new residents who were not included in 
the initial bond elections and who, presumably, would be more inclined to support the 
bonds.14  This suggests a new form of gerrymandering in which bonding districts 
manipulate their borders to shape their constituencies in ways that will allow them to 
more easily pursue their infrastructure agenda.  We believe this phenomenon of local 
gerrymandering to shape the constituency based on their preferences concerning certain 
important policies deserves further scholarly attention to determine whether it leads to 
                                                
14 Paul Sisson, Tri-City Eyes Shadowridge Annexation, N. COUNTY TIMES, Jan. 29. 2008. 
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optimal decisions on infrastructure and other policies.  It also raises questions about the 
nature of democratic institutions, particularly when there are multiple, overlapping 
jurisdictions with boundaries that are amenable to change. 
The justifications for these hospital bond measures were the same:  to 
accommodate population increases, to expand emergency services, and to retrofit 
facilities for earthquake safety.  Voters faced a difficult policy choice influenced by many 
complex economic and social considerations in the context of simultaneous or closely 
related votes in other districts about funding similar health infrastructure.  For example, 
San Diego has the fewest number of emergency room beds per capita of any county in 
California.15  Emergency room bed capacity in San Diego County, however, increased six 
percent in the 1990s, and these beds experienced only “moderate visits per bed,” perhaps 
“due to the use of military medical facilities.”16  Moreover, every emergency room in San 
Diego County lost money in 1999-2000, with county-wide losses totaling nearly $22 
million.17  As a result, three San Diego emergency rooms closed in the 1990s, and more 
hospitals recommended closing their emergency rooms in 2005 and 2006.  The 
simultaneous expansion of hospitals and emergency rooms in one district and the closure 
of emergency rooms in other districts demonstrate the complexity of financing healthcare 
facilities and locating them near populations that need them. 
The San Diego hospital bond measures were justified by several different reasons; 
one was the need to retrofit buildings to comply with state-mandated seismic rules.  
According to an article in the North County Times, “In San Diego County three public 
                                                
15 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM:  USE OF SERVICES IN 
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (2003). 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 OFFICE OF STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV., HOSPITAL FINANCIAL DATA DISCLOSURE REPORT (1999-2000). 
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district hospitals — Tri-City, Grossmont and Palomar Pomerado Health, which has 
hospitals in Escondido and Poway — have floated large general obligation bonds to help 
rebuild their facilities in the name of compliance with new statewide seismic rules.”18  In 
fact, in the campaign for Proposition F in the Tri City Medical District, the proponents of 
the bond depicted the area’s hospitals as in danger of collapse and therefore needing new 
funds for repairs.19  The CEO of the Tri-City Medical Center claimed that the medical 
center had to update 70 percent of its buildings by 2013 to meet new earthquake 
standards.20  The campaigns run by the hospitals in support of the new bonds implied that 
without new financing the hospitals would be forced to close for noncompliance with 
regulatory standards.  If these statements were true, the voters were faced with the choice 
either to raise taxes or to face a future without nearby hospitals. 
The hospital bonds are a clear example of take-it-or-leave-it offers as described by 
Romer and Rosenthal, who find that the ability to make such an offer confers tremendous 
power upon the person or group who presents the initial policy offer.  In this example, the 
reversion point, according to the bond supporters, was future closure of the hospital.  
Voters could not amend the bond proposal to ensure that policy ends up at the pivotal 
voter’s ideal point.  Instead they were forced to choose between 1) the precise bond they 
were offered (the agenda setter’s preference) and hospitals that would withstand 
earthquakes, and 2) no bond and (allegedly) no local hospitals.  It is possible that they 
preferred neither of these two options to an alternative state of the world, but they lacked 
the power to propose and consider other alternatives. 
                                                
18 Paul Sisson, Tri-City’s Prop. F Failed for Myriad of Reasons, N. COUNTY TIMES, June 24, 2006. 
19 Paul Sisson, Tri-City’s Proposition F Campaign Nears the $1 Million Mark, N. COUNTY TIMES, June 2, 2006. 
20 Id. 
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2. Sequential Votes and the Race to the Polls 
 Like take-it-or-leave-it offers, the problem of sequential elimination agendas 
occurs in direct democracy at all levels of government, but it can be exacerbated in local 
bond measure elections because of the existence of multiple, overlapping taxing 
authorities combined with some limit (regardless of its source) on taxes.  The 
consequences can include severe misallocation of tax resources in local infrastructure 
decisions.  We begin by demonstrating how sequential elimination agendas can arise, 
providing a case study of bond measures proposed in Austin, Texas, and then we explore 
how a budget constraint can lead to a race to the polls by governments and to outcomes 
no one prefers. 
2.1.  Sequential Elimination Agendas and Bond Propositions:  Theory and Reality 
In Figure 3 we present a theoretical community of five voters.  Each voter has 
preferences over five different policy areas (school, traffic, water, police, and fire) that 
are ranked from first to fifth.  We assume that each bond project costs $100 million and 
that voters will support $200 million of bonds (i.e., voters have a budget constraint and 
will only support two projects).  Consistent with bond elections in California and many 
other jurisdictions, we assume that these bonds need a two-thirds majority to pass.  We 
also assume that bond measures are governed by fairly strict single-subject rules so that 
each individual bond must be presented to voters as a separate proposition.21  Further, as 
in standard Condorcet voting examples, we examine possible outcomes when voters 
                                                
21 For details about the legal requirements concerning local initiatives and referendums in California, including the 
single-subject requirement, see USC/Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics, Local Government and Direct 
Democracy Project, http://mylaw.usc.edu/haynes/report.cfm (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).  The text of California’s single-
subject rule as it applies to state initiatives can be found in the CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, ART. II, §8(d).  For a 
detailed discussion of how single-subject rules can create consider problems with sequential elimination agendas and 
block voters from making tradeoffs between ballot questions, see Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 4, at 964-66. 
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make sincere choices and only engage in pure voting strategies.22  Government officials 
cannot bundle bonds to offer voters different combinations; instead, each is voted on 
separately and simultaneously.  In the table, S=School, T=Traffic, W=Water, P= Police, 
F=Fire. 
Figure 3: Voter Preferences over different policy areas 
 Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 
1st S T W P F 
2nd T W F F S 
3rd  W P P S T 
4th  P F S T W 
5th  F S T W P 
 
We now consider the outcome for a number of different possible ballot 
configurations. 
• A ballot featuring S, T and W leads to the passage of S and T with four votes 
and defeat of W with only two votes. 
• A ballot featuring S, T and F leads to the passage of S and F with four votes 
and the defeat of T with two votes. 
• A ballot featuring S, P and F leads to the passage of P and F with four votes 
and the defeat of S with two votes. 
                                                
22 For a review of agenda manipulation and its effects on elections outcomes, see Thomas Schwartz, Votes, Strategies 
and Institutions:  An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice” in CONGRESS:  STRUCTURE AND POLICY 318 
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, eds., 1987). 
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• Simultaneous consideration of all five bonds leads to none of them receiving 
the required two-thirds majority. 
 These examples demonstrate that ballot composition will significantly affect what 
policies are passed.  As Ordeshook and Schwartz emphasize, “[A]s soon as the feasible 
agendas are allowed to include…sequential elimination agendas…sincere voting can lead 
practically anywhere [in the policy space].”23  Furthermore, if voters will only support 
two projects, then agencies will try to ensure that their proposals are included among the 
first two approved, creating a race to the polls for fear that two other agencies would have 
their proposals approved.  Returning to Figure 3 above, consider how ballot structure 
affects voting outcomes when voters will only support two propositions.  For example, if 
propositions for Schools (S) and Fire (S) appear on the same ballot, then the fire 
proposition (F) will win. If on the next ballot Traffic (T) and Water (W) appear, then 
Traffic (T) will win.  Because voters’ budget constraint limits them to the approval of two 
propositions, then the outcome of the two elections will be T and F.  Now consider 
another example of two sequential elections.  In the first election Police (P) and Fire (F) 
are placed on the same ballot, and Police (P) wins.  In the second election Schools (S) 
and Traffic (T) face off in the election, and Schools (S) win.  After adopting two 
propositions, voters have hit their budget constraint and will not support additional 
propositions, so S and T are the outcomes of the election process.  These two examples 
demonstrate how the order of voting alone can determine the final policy outcome, a 
reality that strategic political actors understand. 
                                                
23 See Ordeshook & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 192. 
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 We turn now to a real-world example of sequential elimination agendas that faced 
voters in Austin, Texas, in the 1980s and 1990s to show concretely the existence of 
sequential elimination agendas at the local level.  Austin is noteworthy because it is a city 
with robust direct democracy in a state that does not have a statewide initiative process, 
although constitutional amendments placed on the ballot by the legislature are submitted 
to a vote of the people.24 
On the September 11, 1982 ballot, Austin voters were faced with a bond election 
that featured 25 different bond propositions.25  They involved authorizing the issuance of 
bonds for infrastructure improvements, such as sewer system, libraries, and parks.  The 
bonds totaled $422,400,000.  As in many other localities, the single-subject requirement 
that applies in Austin to local initiatives, including bond proposals, requires that each 
specific project be voted on as a separate measure.26  The utility system propositions were 
often highly specific and clearly described the intended use of the money and the 
geographic area that the new infrastructure would serve.  In the election, only 22 percent 
(38,216) of 173,607 voters actually cast ballots.  All the propositions passed, most with 
more than 70 percent of voters approving.  One lesson of this case study, in addition to 
the likelihood of decision making pathologies caused by sequential elimination agendas, 
is that voter turnout is often very low in such elections, raising questions whether the 
result is skewed rather than representative of the entire citizenry. 
                                                
24 M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 399-400 (2003). 
25 Information about Austin election history can be obtained at Austin City Connection, Office of the City Clerk, 
Election History, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/election/search.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). 
26 Information about the rules and regulations governing Austin’s initiative process can be found at USC/Caltech 
Center for the Study of Law and Politics, Local Government and Direct Democracy Project, 
http://mylaw.usc.edu/haynes/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). 
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Two years later in September 1984, the ballot was filled with 28 propositions, 
proposing to spend a total of $954,935,000.  Again, each involved authorizing the 
issuance of bonds for a local infrastructure project, and the authorizations specifically 
identified a particular project and often a geographic area that would presumably benefit 
from the expenditure.  As in 1982, all of the propositions passed.  Just four months later 
in January 1985, voters were presented with another 19 propositions on the ballot.  
However, only two of the measures involved bonds for infrastructure – an art museum 
and a new thoroughfare.  The bond for the art museum, totaling just over $20 million, 
passed, and the bond for the new road, totaling $47 million, failed. 
Elections that feature dozens of propositions and hundreds of millions of dollars 
of bonds continue to characterize local direct democracy in Austin.  In August 1992, the 
Austin ballot included 22 bond-related measures.  Sixteen of the 22 were for new 
infrastructure and totaled almost $364 million in authorized spending.  The targets for the 
spending included street improvements, land acquisition for parks and recreation, and 
improving or extending the city’s waterworks and wastewater system.  At the same time 
that voters were asked to approve new spending, they were being asked to revoke 
bonding authority they had granted the utility system in 1984 and 1985.  For this General 
Municipal Election, held in the middle of summer, 73,308 out of 265, 903 (27.57 percent) 
of voters came to the polls.  Of the 16 requests for additional spending authority, all but 
three passed.  The three bond issues that failed included two related to a cultural arts 
center and one concerning reimbursement for a building the city already bought. 
In November 1998, Austin voters were asked to decide on the fate of ten 
infrastructure propositions totaling more than $670 million in new bond obligations.  
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Turnout in this election was 35 percent, and at least one commentator raised questions 
about the competence of the voters to make these financing decisions, a concern to which 
we will return in subsequent sections of this article.  A November 5, 1998 Austin 
American Statesman article asked, “So how many of the 127,000 or so Austinites who 
voted on the propositions could describe even 25 of the projects?  15?  5?  City officials 
and political consultants agree that, in an election with little money for advertising on 
most of the propositions, many voters probably entered the ballot booth with some 
mixture of specific knowledge, general recollection and cluelessness.”27 
It is clear from the description of these elections in Austin that any decisions 
made through the votes are likely to be suboptimal.  Voters cannot make tradeoffs among 
the bond propositions in one election, let alone across elections, even those held 
relatively closely in time.  Instead, they must vote “yes” or “no” on each bond, without 
the ability to tailor their response or to package certain bonds as a group.  Moreover, they 
must make decisions on each bond measure in a particular election without knowing 
whether the other bonds on the same ballot will pass or fail.  This may deprive voters of 
important information; for example, a voter may be willing to support a cultural arts 
building but only if other bonds on the ballot are not simultaneously approved. 
Although Austin’s citizens considered dozens of bonds in these two decades, 
government officials were presumably limited in the number of bonds they could issue by 
the bond market and the voters’ willingness to continue to pass infrastructure 
propositions.  In this case study, only one jurisdiction faces such a limit, and it could 
manage its aggregate exposure by revoking some bond authority when officials believed 
                                                
27 Ben Wear, Leaders:  Bonds Won on Fine Times, Popular Mayor, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 5, 1998. 
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they needed to, as occurred in August 1992.  Coordination is possible, and past decisions 
can be revisited.  How is the situation changed when more than one governmental entity 
seeks to levy bonds, asking the voters to finance them?  Then we may see a race to the 
polls as jurisdictions seek to get their projects funded before any de jure or de facto limit 
is reached. 
2.2.  The Race to the Polls:  The Example of Community Facilities Districts 
The incentives for bonding authorities faced with sequential elimination agendas 
and the reality of some limit on the ability to issue bonds seem likely to lead to policy 
outcomes in which money is spent on the projects that are approved first and other, 
perhaps more beneficial projects are rejected as the taxing and bonding limit of a given 
jurisdiction has been reached.  This can only coincidentally lead to an efficient use of 
resources.  Although all states have overlapping tax jurisdictions (city, county, fire, 
hospital, school, etc.) and therefore could suffer from exacerbated sequential elimination 
agendas, many Californians are subject to an additional authority, the so-called Mello-
Roos Community Facilities Districts.  We provide a brief overview of these districts 
because few scholars, and probably even fewer voters, are aware of them.  They provide 
an extreme example of the challenges that characterize local direct democracy. 
In 1982 the California legislature passed the Mello-Roos Community Facilities 
Act,28 which allows local governments to establish Mello-Roos tax assessment districts, 
also called Community Facilities Districts (CFDs), to finance public services and 
facilities in that area.  A petition to create a CFD can take one of several forms:  1) a 
written request signed by two members of the legislative body (i.e., a local government or 
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school district); 2) a petition signed by 10 percent of the eligible voters in the area; or 3) a 
petition signed by the landowners of 10 percent of the area in the proposed district.  
Following certain procedures, the governing body then adopts a resolution to establish a 
CFD and, if two-thirds of voters within the CFD area approve, the CFD is established.29  
A Mello-Roos district has bonding and taxing authority and can raise infrastructure funds 
for essentially any use that is neither an existing facility nor service.  Landowners within 
a CFD have the power to make the first move on setting the tax rate and infrastructure 
plans for the area included in the CFD, thereby allowing the current residents or 
landowners to affect the infrastructure and tax rates that all the future residents of the area 
will pay.  Future residents may be able to add further bond obligations subject to bond 
capacity limits, and they may rescind any bond that has been authorized but not issued, 
but they cannot stop paying once the CFD has entered into an authorized obligation. 
CFDs are only one aspect of the challenge facing localities in financing 
infrastructure in an environment characterized by multiple, overlapping jurisdictions.  
The California Debt Advisory Commission pointed out that failed coordination among 
jurisdictions can cause considerable problems with planning infrastructure build outs: 
Mello-Roos financing also exposes an organizational weakness in the 
collective response of local governments serving developing areas; 
namely, there is often no coordination of the financial decisions of 
different local governments supported by the same group of taxpayers.  In 
the absence of coordinated planning, taxpayers are vulnerable to onerous 
overlapping tax burden.  This is especially problematic given the ease with 
which CFDs can be formed.  Developing areas are typically served by the 
city or county government, one or more school districts, and often one or 
more special districts.  Each of these local government units has the 
authority to approve the formation of CFDs and to levy special taxes on 
                                                                                                                                            
28 CAL. GOVT. CODE., CHPT. 2.5 THE MELLO-ROOS COMMUNITY FACILITIES ACT OF 1982, ART. 1, GENERAL 
PROVISIONS, § 53311. 
29 See CAL. GOVT. CODE., CHPT. 2.5 THE MELLO-ROOS COMMUNITY FACILITIES ACT OF 1982, ART. 2, PROCEEDINGS TO 
CREATE A COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICT, §§ 53318-53329.5. 
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the same group of taxpayers.  Though each special tax may be imposed in 
good faith and dedicated to worthwhile projects, the cumulative burden of 
the special taxes could prove excessive to the taxpayers.30 
 
 This passage also acknowledges that taxpayers may eventually impose a de facto 
or de jure limit on taxation.  The imposition of such a limit implies that once taxes reach 
a certain level, new infrastructure funds will not be approved.  Anticipating that reaction, 
each taxing authority has an incentive to be the first mover in raising taxes so that it can 
ensure its projects are approved before any tax limit is reached.  When bond proposals are 
considered one-by-one across jurisdictions, the outcomes reached may not be those not 
preferred by the pivotal voter of a given political area.  Moreover, the competition for 
debt financing may also result in low-priority projects securing financing in advance of 
higher-priority projects, with the consequence that infrastructure development does not 
occur efficiently.  Precisely this problem is recognized by the Debt Advisory 
Commission in its recommendation for an aggregate limit on tax burden: 
We recommend in the project evaluation guidelines to follow that the total 
tax burden in developing areas should not exceed two percent of the 
appraised fair market value of the property upon completion of all public 
and private improvements.  It should be recognized, however, that such 
limitations can produce an unhealthy competition between local 
governments for available debt capacity, as each local government may be 
tempted to grab some of the debt capacity while it is still available.  . . .  
The danger is that available debt capacity will be squandered on lower 
priority facilities which can be phased-in later, leaving the developing area 
without the resources to address immediate needs.31 
 
                                                
30 KATHLEEN BROWN, CAL. DEBT ADVISORY COMM’N, GUIDELINES FOR MELLO-ROOS FINANCING 2 (1991) (emphasis in 
original). 
31 Id. at 2. 
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With limits on tax capacity, not only can policy end up far from where the pivotal voter 
would prefer, but it may also be impossible to reverse course because the tax capacity is 
already being fully used. 
 The logic of the race to the polls for debt financing may help to explain the 
discrepancy between the amount of bonds approved by the voters and the actual amount 
of bonds issued pursuant to that authorization.  Although we lack precise data on the 
difference between approved bond financing and actual sales, it is apparently quite 
common in California for jurisdictions to request far greater bond approval than they 
actually use.  For instance, a school district may pass a $100 million bond but only sell 
half that amount; indeed, this appears to be a relatively common phenomenon.  Knowing 
that the existence of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions leads to a race to the polls that 
may result in voter disapproval for bonds submitted for a vote later in the process, 
bonding authorities have an incentive to request larger bonds than needed in order to 
make sure they have flexibility in the event that voters refuse to fund future projects.  
Furthermore, once voters have reached their budget constraint and are no longer willing 
to approve new bonds, then bonding authorities may exercise some creativity in an 
attempt to circumvent the requirement of voter approval for new bond issues, often 
through the use of revenue bonds.32 
The influence of CFDs in certain areas is demonstrated by the Poway School 
District.  At its January 17, 2006 school board meeting, school board members had six 
new items on their agenda, four involving a CFD.  The members approved resolutions to 
form CFD No. 14, to study the need for bonded indebtedness in CFD No. 14, to declare 
                                                
32 See Kiewiet & Szakaly, supra note 1, at 69-70 (discussing circumvention possibility). 
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the results of an election in CFD No. 14, and to authorize the levy of special taxes in CFD 
No. 14.  During the meeting, the board took time for public comment, but no one took 
advantage of this opportunity.  Essentially, all of the actions at this school board meeting 
involved making real estate and taxation decisions for a geographic area, not the work 
voters typically associate with school boards.  This CFD is actually only one of the more 
than 20 different tax charges (mostly CFDs or improvement areas within a CFD) that the 
Poway District manages.33  In newly developing areas of California where the initial 
infrastructure build out has not been completed, school districts, through CFDs, are an 
important player in the development of infrastructure.  
CFDs associated with school districts have used their power to annex new areas, 
thereby applying their existing tax rates to the newly annexed territory.  This allows the 
CFD to increase its revenue base, which will eventually support infrastructure 
development.  Take, for example, Santa Cruz County in California.  In June 2001 there 
were two elections by CFDs to allow different school districts within this county to annex 
adjoining territory.  In one election eight voters participated, and in the other eleven 
people voted – in a county that had more than 145,000 registered voters in November 
2000.34  As far as we can determine, these elections occur without much fanfare or 
aggressive campaigning, and it seems unlikely that they offer the conditions for learning 
to voters, conditions that we will describe in Section 3. 
3. The Information Environment Surrounding Local Initiatives 
                                                
33 The different tax charges within the Poway School District can be found at 
http://www.californiataxdata.com/gov/taxcharges/index.asp?agencyid=10696. 
34 See County Clerk Gail L. Pellerin, Statement of Vote for the July 26, 2005 Special Election Submitted to the Santa 
Cruz County Board of Supervisors (July 27, 2005), available at http://sccounty01.co.santa-
cruz.ca.us/bds/GovStream/BDSvData/non_legacy/Minutes/2005/20050802/PDF/018-1.pdf. 
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The success of the initiative and referendum process in producing policy that reflects 
voters’ preferences relies heavily on a citizen’s capacity to discover and use information 
that allows her to determine how to vote consistently with her interests.  One challenge 
facing voters, particularly in the local context, is that bond and other ballot measure 
campaigns can be relatively low information environments, without the cues available in 
candidate elections like party affiliation and incumbency. Voter guides, produced at 
public expense and sent to all voters before an election in most localities, provide a list of 
reasons for and against each initiative and corresponding rebuttals.  The existence of 
these guides, with the presentation of arguments, reflects a faith in reason that has been 
widely shared by reform-minded citizens dating back to the Progressive movement.  The 
give-and-take of reasons is believed to produce voter enlightenment and the ability to 
make welfare-enhancing decisions through the ballot box.35  
Modern advertising vividly illustrates, however, that providing reasons is not 
sufficient for informed decision making.  Marketers may offer reasons for consumers to 
purchase their products, but people need more information to decide competently.  The 
Federal Trade Commission found that nearly 55 percent of ads about weight loss 
products contained false statements.  The advertisement for the “Fat Trapper,” for 
example, claimed that the product, extracted from the shell of crustaceans, prevented the 
absorption of fat. 36  This fallacious claim shows that just having reasons for an action is 
                                                
35 We focus on the whether voters have information or its substitutes, but do not analyze possible outcomes 
of low information for the more complicated interaction between voters, interest groups and legislature. 
Others have pointed out that if the legislature cannot discern the median voter’s preferences then the 
legislature may accommodate extreme voters or interest groups to prevent a possible initiative threat, see 
John G. Matsusaka and Nolan M. McCarty. 2001. Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of 
Voter Initiatives. J LAW ECON ORGAN 17: 413-448. 
36 FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT, DECEPTION IN WEIGHT-LOSS ADVERTISING WORKSHOP:  SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO STOP WEIGHT-LOSS FRAUD (2003). 
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not enough:  people also need to know that those who make statements are informed and 
trustworthy for a reasoned choice to occur.37 
Similarly, a faith in reason alone as a mechanism to ensure sound policy emerges 
from direct democracy is misplaced.  Merely providing reasons in a voter pamphlet is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for informed decision making.  Reasons are not sufficient 
because they may simply be lies and provide no useful information to voters.  Likewise, 
the presence of reasons is not necessary for informed choice because voters may be able 
make a reasoned decision from voting cues, such as a statement by a trusted endorser 
without independently assessing the merits of the reasons.  Data from an exit poll we 
conducted in San Diego during the February 2008 California election38 demonstrates the 
importance of cues and the variability of the information environments surrounding ballot 
measures.  In this election, there were no local bond propositions on the San Diego ballot, 
but there were seven statewide ballot measures.  Proposition 91 prohibited earmarked 
fuel taxes from being used for any purpose other than transportation; Proposition 92 dealt 
with community college fees; term limits were the subject of Proposition 93; and 
Propositions 94 through 97 addressed expansion of gaming at casinos in Southern 
California Indian reservations.  Voter knowledge about the ballot measures was not 
impressive despite broadcast advertising on several propositions and voter guides that 
provided reasons.  A majority of voters responded that they were unsure about specific 
provisions of most propositions on the February 2008 ballot.  In addition, about one-half 
of those who answered factual questions did not give the correct response. 
                                                
37 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 6, at 71. 
38 During the 2008 California primary, a private exit poll of 615 voters in San Diego, California, was conducted in eight 
precincts spread out around San Diego.  The eight precincts represented a wide cross-section of San Diego voters.  The 
poll was conducted in an interview format, with all questions asked and responses recorded by trained volunteers.  
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Even without understanding the substance of the proposals, however, voters could 
still have voted competently using voting cues.  The strength of such cues in this election 
was mixed.  The authors of the Proposition 91, for example, had provided a statement in 
the voter guide urging voters to vote against the proposition because it was no longer 
needed; advocates had reached a deal with the legislature.39  Many people were not aware 
of this cue, however, and about 50 percent who claimed to know about the cue responded 
incorrectly.  Proposition 91 was an extremely low-information proposition because there 
was almost no advertising on either side of the issue.  In contrast, an overwhelming 
majority of voters responded, correctly, that Governor Schwarzenegger supported 
Propositions 94 through 97.  Whether or not a voter followed Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s endorsement was strongly related to her view of the job the governor 
was doing; if she approved of the Governor’s performance, she used this as a shortcut to 
deciding to support the propositions, reasoning that her interests were aligned with 
Schwarzenegger’s.40  The main difference between the sue provided by supporters of 
Proposition 91 and the cue relevant to the Indian gaming propositions was that latter was 
very prominent in the public discourse during the election, with many broadcast 
advertisements informing voters of the Governor’s views.  This poll provides a concrete 
example of the use and helpfulness of shortcuts in voter decision making, and the 
difference between information environments for ballot measures, even in the same 
election.  We now turn to a more sustained analysis of voting cues in local elections 
concerning bond measures. 
                                                                                                                                            
Random sampling was used; the exit poll volunteer asked every other voter to participate. 
39 Michael Cababatuan, Backers Now Urge Voting Against Prop. 91, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2008. 
40 For further discussion of the importance of such voting cues, see Section 3.2 infra. 
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3.1.  Voter Guides:  Providing Reasons and Endorsements 
Voter guides, as well as other sources of information in a ballot campaign,41 may 
provide voters with trustworthy endorsements to supplement the reasons provided for 
each side.42  The rules governing who may submit arguments to be included in a voter 
pamphlet differ depending on the municipal jurisdiction.  In the city of San Diego, for 
instance, only one argument for and one argument against any measure/proposition are 
included in the voter pamphlet.  In the event that multiple statements are submitted, the 
city clerk determines which is included in the pamphlet using criteria established in the 
municipal code.43  In Los Angeles, ballot arguments are limited to 300 words unless the 
measure involves the reorganization of a school or community college district.44  The 
author(s) of the ballot arguments must state that they believe their argument is true and 
correct to “the best of his/her knowledge and belief.”  There does not appear to be a limit 
on the number of arguments for or against a measure in Los Angeles.  Similarly, San 
Francisco also does not limit the number of arguments for or against a ballot proposition.  
The Director of Elections chooses one statement to serve as the opponent’s statement and 
another to serve as the proponent’s statement for each ballot measure.45  If a person or 
group submits a statement that is not chosen as the official proponent’s or opponent’s 
                                                
41 We will assess one of these additional sources of information in Section 3.3 infra in our analysis of newspaper 
articles and editorials. 
42 Of course, not all voters read the pamphlets as our exit poll demonstrated and so may not be directly exposed to these 
arguments.  However, such pamphlets make it more likely that voters will encounter some of the arguments or learn the 
identities of groups active on one or both sides of a measure.  And, as “convenience voting” becomes more 
commonplace and more voters take advantage of the ability to vote at home with absentee ballots, they may more 
frequently consult voter guides and other informational sources as they vote. 
43 See SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE, CHPT 2: GOVERNMENT, ART, 7: ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND LOBBYING, 
DIVISION 5:  BALLOTS AND MEASURES, available at: 
http://docs.sandiego.gov/municode/MuniCodeChapter02/Ch02Art07Division05.pdf. 
44 This information is drawn from ELECTION CODE OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CHPT IV:  ART. B VOTER 
INFORMATION PAMPHLET, § 402 CONTENTS OF THE VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, available at 
http://www.lacity.org/clk/urldoc2832.pdf. 
45 The rules are described in: CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS CODE, ARTICLE V:  
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statement, then the author must pay a fee of $200 plus $2 per word, up to a limit of 300 
words, to have the statement appear in the voter guide.46  According to California 
Elections Code, all material submitted to a voter pamphlet must undergo a ten day public 
examination period during which any voter or the election official in the district can 
examine the material; if he believes material to be false, he can submit a request to 
preempt publication of the questionable statement.47  The election official then 
determines whether or not the statement will be published. 
Voter guides identify the authors of the arguments supporting and opposing the 
measure, and this information may provide voters the cues they need, depending on 
whether or not readers are familiar with the people or groups and understand what 
viewpoints they represent.48  Indeed, depending on the conditions, just knowing which 
groups support or oppose a particular bond measure may be sufficient to enable a voter to 
vote competently without any further assessment of the merits of the arguments made in 
the pamphlet.  Consider the information provided in the voter pamphlet in November 
2001 regarding the Alpine Fire Protection District.  Only a statement supporting the bond 
measure appeared; apparently, the proposition did not garner enough attention to 
motivate opponents of the bond to reply: 
The current fire station built over 50 years ago has leaky roofs and an 
overloaded electrical system.  There is insufficient space for modern 
firefighting apparatus, new paramedic equipment and facilities for female 
firefighters.  It fails to meet earthquake standards and does not allow for 
decontamination after hazardous calls. 
 
Funds set aside for a new fire station are not adequate. 
                                                                                                                                            
ELECTION MATERIAL MAILED TO THE VOTERS, §§ 540, 545 & 550. 
46 Information on San Francisco voter pamphlets is drawn from: CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS CODE, ARTICLE V:  ELECTION MATERIAL MAILED TO THE VOTERS, §§ 500-595. 
47 CAL. ELEC. CODE, DIVISION 9, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 6, § 9295. 
48 Cf. Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, at 296-99 (discussing importance of such cues in statewide elections). 
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Every penny from Proposition A will stay in Alpine and may only be used 
for fire safety and paramedic programs.49 
 
Unless a reader had knowledge about these matters, it would be hard for her to 
verify the validity of the assertions.  How would the typical voter know the 
physical condition of the fire station?  Even if she traveled to the building to 
check for leaks, she could not determine whether the construction was seismically 
sound.  The voter guide provided the identities of the sponsors of this statement, 
however, and this might have provided essential information.  Advocates included 
a publisher of a local newspaper, the president of the firefighters association, the 
president of the chamber of commerce and a board member of the local fire 
protection district.  As we will discuss below, under certain conditions, this 
information might be sufficient to allow citizens to decide which vote served their 
interests. 
 Voter pamphlets throughout California provide similar information.  In 2000, 
voters in Cajon Valley in San Diego County were asked to decide whether to support a 
$75 million bond for school infrastructure.50  The voter pamphlet included a statement by 
the County Counsel providing basic details about the use of the money and the likely 
interest rates on the bonds.  There was also a statement in favor of the proposition by a 
group explaining more about the projects that the bond would support (i.e., upgraded 
libraries, new books, new school construction, etc).  The authors of the statement 
included the President of the East County Latino Association, the past President of the 
Mother Goose Parade, a real estate broker, a businessman and the past President of the El 
                                                
49 Information from SmartVoter.org, http://www.smartvoter.org/2001/11/06/ca/sd/meas/A/ (last visited July 10, 2006). 
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Cajon Historical Society.  Finally, there is a county-prepared tax rate statement that 
described the likely tax changes to property owners in the district. 
This Cajon Valley voter guide illustrates that some jurisdictions require that 
nonpartisan professional government officials provide certain kinds of highly relevant 
information to voters in the ballot pamphlet.  In Cajon Valley, voters were provided a 
statement about the predicted effect on property taxes, as well as a description of the 
bond and the likely interest rate.  All the San Francisco voter pamphlets that we examined 
from after 1975 also contain supposedly neutral information provided by officials that is 
intended to increase the possibility of learning.  First, each measure includes an “Analysis 
By Ballot Simplification Committee,”51 which is an abstract of the purpose of the 
initiatives and its likely effects.  The simplification statement contains information about 
the status quo, how the proposal will change the status quo, and a short statement 
describing the effect of a “yes” vote and of a “no” vote.  The second feature, the city 
controller’s statement, provides voters with information about the tax rates they will face 
before and after a bond passes and what construction will occur as a result of the bond.  
These kinds of statements do not tell voters which action to take and so they do not 
constitute an endorsement.  Nevertheless, the reasons may help some voters who already 
have some knowledge and can assess the merits of the analysis or use this discussion to 
                                                                                                                                            
50 Information from SmartVoter.org, http://www.smartvoter.org/2000/11/07/ca/sd/meas/X/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2007). 
51 The City of San Francisco’s website provides a description of the Ballot Simplification Committee: 
Of the five voting members, the Board of Supervisors appoints three and the Mayor appoints two.  Two of 
the three members appointed by the Board of Supervisors must be nominated by either the Northern 
California Chapter of the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences or the Northern California 
Broadcasters Association.  The League of Women Voters of San Francisco must nominate the third member.  
Of the two members appointed by the Mayor, the Northern California Newspaper Guild must nominate one 
member, and the other member must be an educational reading specialist recommended by the 
Superintendent of Schools of the San Francisco Unified School District.  Each of the appointive members 
must be a resident and registered voter of the City and County. 
City of San Francisco, Ballot Simplification Committee, http://www.sfgov.org/site/elections_index.asp?id=21619 (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
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analyze the arguments provided for and against the ballot measure.  In addition, 
information about any change in taxes or property values may be helpful shortcuts for 
voters, although without ways to assess this cost against the benefits of a bond that might 
not be fully reflected in property values, it may not be enough information to ensure voter 
competence. 
 Some who possess a faith in reason claim that the process of providing reasons 
fosters deliberation among citizens, which equips them to make competent choices 
concerning ballot measures.  The factual statements by government officials provide 
information prepared by those with expertise, and the statements by opponents and 
proponents are designed to elicit discussion and critical analysis by the citizenry.  
However, the provision of reasons is simply cheap talk in standard models of 
communication unless people receiving the reasons can verify that they are true or there 
are institutions in place to induce truthful statements by a speaker.52 
 A corollary to the belief in the importance of reasons and reasoning is the 
assumption that competition between speakers and their reasons will improve voters’ 
ability to make a welfare-enhancing decision.  Of course, as the voter pamphlet from the 
Alpine Fire Protection District demonstrates, there are not always two active sides in 
local ballot proposition campaigns.  Even when competition exists, however, Boudreau 
and McCubbins show that adversarial competition does not guarantee that learning will 
occur.53  Instead, other conditions for learning must be met, and the existence of those 
conditions must be common knowledge between all participants for enlightenment to 
                                                
52 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 6, at Chapters 2-8. 
53 Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, From Competition to Competence?  Theory and Experiments Regarding 
Deliberation and Citizen Learning (June 28, 2007) (working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997199). 
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occur.  Unless the conditions for learning exist and they are known to all, having multiple 
speakers only increases the amount of noise in the environment because no speaker’s 
statements can be considered credible; therefore, listeners cannot necessarily learn.  
There is a positive consequence relating to the presence of multiple endorsers in a 
competitive election, however.  It increases the probability that a given voter will 
encounter a trusted endorser.  Determining when an endorsement is credible and 
trustworthy – and therefore when learning is possible – is the issue to which we turn next. 
3.2. Learning from Endorsements 
 One of the common findings in models of voter decision making is that, in 
complete information settings, the majority (represented by the median voter) is made 
better off through the existence of an initiative process.54  However, as we have 
demonstrated above, voters often do not have complete information even when 
institutions provide them with reasons relating to a particular decision.55  In the absence 
of complete information, voters must find substitutes that allow them to make decisions 
as if they were fully informed.  Frequently, the substitutes for information take the form 
of endorsements that replace detailed factual knowledge and can provide voters with 
information about which way to vote on an issue.  Not all endorsements facilitate 
learning, however; the key is to identify the conditions under which they can increase 
voter competence. 
 Lupia demonstrates that voters can learn from campaigns in his study of the 1988 
California insurance initiatives.56  His argument outlines, in concrete terms, the 
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conditions under which endorsements can replace complete information and serve as 
effective voting cues to promote voter competence.  First, Lupia points out that the policy 
positions of endorsers must be widely known to voters.  Total spending for the insurance 
campaigns in 1988 was more than $82 million, demonstrating an aggressive campaign to 
publicize positions.  Second, the various interest groups and campaigners were 
identifiable as members of one of three main groups:  the insurance industry, trial lawyers 
or consumer activists.  For Lupia, the key is that a voter can identify which groups 
support or oppose a particular initiative and then also identify the group with whom the 
voter has common interests.  Determining common interests is made easier when voters 
know an information provider’s (speaker’s) reputation for supporting certain types of 
policy, which in turn is made easier when voters can identify the source of the 
information, and the source has a well-known policy preference.  In 1988 voters in 
California faced multiple, likely confusing, insurance initiatives, but the presence of well-
funded campaigns and known endorsers with publicly recognizable reputations enabled 
uninformed voters to use information shortcuts to vote as if they were informed.  This 
example provides a general sense of the actual conditions in the political environment 
that lead voters to learn from the statements of endorsers. 
 The general conditions under which voters can learn from endorsements are 
derived and tested experimentally by Lupia and McCubbins.57  Lupia and McCubbins 
show that external forces can generate trust, persuasion, and the possibility of learning in 
contexts where these outcomes would not otherwise occur.58  Specifically, this work 
details what conditions must exist for a voter to learn from the statements of an endorser, 
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even if that endorser is not speaking to the specific voter.  Lupia and McCubbins 
demonstrate that for a voter to learn from the statements of an endorser, the voter must 
believe that an endorser is both knowledgeable and trustworthy.  The trust condition can 
be met only if a person believes that the endorser is trustworthy.  Trust requires one of 
four additional conditions:  1) the listener and endorser must have common interests; 2) 
there must be a threat of verification imposed upon the endorser; 3) the endorser must 
face penalties for lying; or 4) there must be observable, costly effort on the part of the 
endorser.  In the absence of the conditions for trust and learning, Lupia and McCubbins 
demonstrate that learning will not happen. 
The conditions for trust must be established between a speaker and a specific 
audience, which need not be the voter who is observing the interaction.  For learning to 
occur for the voter/observer, it is critical that she understands the relationship between an 
endorser and the audience to whom he is speaking.  If a speaker makes a statement to an 
audience that regards him as trusted endorser, then all listeners can be “flies on the wall” 
and learn from that statement as long as they are aware of the relationship between 
speaker and audience and know that the conditions for trust are met.59  Notice that the 
presence of the conditions for trust is a separate requirement from whether an observer 
knows the conditions are met; both are necessary, and the presence of the conditions for 
trust does not guarantee that the observer knows about the conditions. 
 Let us provide a few concrete examples to flesh out the theoretical work.  
Observers may be able to figure out the trustworthiness of a statement about gun control 
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by the President of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) when he is speaking to a gun 
club (as long as they know that the audience consists of gun aficionados), but observers 
may not know how to interpret a similar statement when he is speaking to a gardening 
club.  Thus, they may not be able learn from the NRA president’s statements in the latter 
context.  The reason for the difference is that the first situation involves both an 
alignment of interests and likely penalties for lying, whereas the second situation does not 
clearly have either common interests or its institutional substitutes.  The NRA president 
may make the exact same statement to both audiences to avoid sending conflicting 
signals that could affect the organization’s reputation, but if a voter is only aware of the 
statement made to the gardening club, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for her to learn 
from this statement, because the conditions for trust are absent in the speech made to the 
gardening club.  However, if the gardening club includes people who are also NRA 
members or who are likely members, there may be penalties for lying even in this 
context.  Only if observers have some knowledge about both the speaker and the listeners 
can they learn enough to use the statements as a voting cue. 
 One challenge for learning in local ballot measure elections is that there are likely 
few endorsers or speakers, which means that it is particularly challenging for individuals 
to witness an endorsement that meets the conditions for learning.  One possible source of 
voting cues is endorsements by local government officials, because in the context of local 
bond measures, most of these propositions are placed on the ballot for popular 
consideration by public officials.  Often voters will know enough about a public official 
to know whether they have shared interests.  Does knowing only that elected officials 
supported placing a bond measure on the ballot allow a voter to learn how to vote on the 
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proposed initiative?  In some cases, a council member’s vote is a credible signal to 
constituents about her views of the worthiness of a proposal, but the official’s vote could 
represent something else as well – public-regarding intentions do not underlie every vote.  
For instance, the decision to refer the bond proposal to the voters could result from a 
variety of situations, such as blame shirking;60 a legal requirement; a decision to fight out 
the proposal’s merits during a campaign; or a logroll across various proposals.  To fully 
understand the audience and the message being conveyed by a legislative vote or other 
statement by an elected official requires analyzing each situation independently; no 
blanket decision can be made.  Thus, knowing that an official supported sending the 
measure to the people may not be an effective voting cue.  Note that a vote to send the 
measure to the ballot is very different from taking a public position endorsing a bond 
measure.  Often an official will endorse or oppose a bond measure either in the voter 
pamphlet or in newspaper stories and advertisements.  Such an endorsement may well 
provide an effective voting cue, particularly if the official faces penalties for strategic 
behavior from her constituents. 
 Even when officials take public positions on a bond measure, not all observers 
can learn because it may be difficult for them to ascertain whether they share interests 
with the official.  A recent survey reveals that many voters are largely unaware of the 
people and issues in local politics, which may make it difficult for voters to assess the 
credibility of endorsers.  In a survey of suburban voters across the country, about 46 
percent reported that they had “a lot” or a “fair” amount of knowledge about local 
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politics.61  Approximately 34 percent of voters in the survey knew a city councilor.  In 
both cases, the level of knowledge decreased as the size of the suburb increased.  In the 
absence of knowledge about local politicians or issues, it will be difficult for voters to 
determine the interests of politicians, which makes it particularly important that voters 
know whether or not the conditions for trust are present and are common knowledge.  
Voter ignorance may be particularly acute in cities were officials are elected in 
nonpartisan campaigns; then, even the helpful voting cue of party affiliation may be 
missing or hard to discover. 62 
 Public officials are not the only possible endorsers from whom voters can learn.  
Consider voters who are faced with a bond to provide money to build more schools in 
their district.  Often the president of the teacher’s union will endorse the bond measure, 
and many voters will know of that endorsement.  Will voters be able to learn from this 
statement?  First, does the union president share common interests with voters?  For a 
voter to know that her interests are shared by the union president, the voter must know 
the union’s interests.  However, there are multiple interests a union president could 
represent:  her own, the union’s, the school district’s, or the teachers’.  These interests 
may coincide, or they may be different.  However, institutional devices may make 
learning possible for the voters hearing the union president’s statements.  For example, 
the union president likely faces a penalty for deviating from the union members’ interests 
because the members can refuse to reelect the president if he is not their faithful agent.  If 
the president faces such a penalty, and a voter is aware of the penalty’s existence, then 
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she may be able to learn from the statement.  Importantly, even a voter who does not 
share common interests with the union may be able to learn from statement, because she 
may know that her interests are opposed to the union’s interests.  The fact that endorsers 
with known opposing interests may provide voting cues to citizens expands the universe 
of credible endorsements that can facilitate learning.63 
 Many of these endorsements appear in voters pamphlets, along with other 
endorsements that do not provide much opportunity for learning.  The cost of placing a 
statement in a voter pamphlet is relatively low so often statements will appear on behalf 
of citizens without a widely-known reputation.  However, those active in ballot measure 
campaigns know that endorsements can change behavior so they work to find public 
officials and leaders of business or other groups who can provide credible statements in 
the pamphlets or in the press.  In the local context, the identities of such people can be 
surprising.  Remember the ballot proposition from Cajon Valley.  Although the President 
of the Latino Association is not a surprising choice as a supporter, the past President of 
the Mother Goose Parade may well seem an odd selection.  Yet, in that community, this 
leader may have a certain reputation and notoriety that could allow her statement to 
increase the chance that voters can make competent choices on Election Day. 
 Before we provide several case studies from California that provide more 
examples of learning by endorsements (as well as environments where learning was 
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unlikely), a discussion of newspapers as a source of information will provide a more 
complete view of the typical information environment in local elections. 
3.3.  Learning from newspapers 
 Much information in local elections comes from newspapers.  Although there are 
other sources of political information even in local campaigns, this Article focuses on 
newspaper reporting for three reasons.  First, historical newspaper records are easily 
available, and they are virtually the only source of information in the ballot measures we 
study from Los Angeles in the early 1900s.  Second, we are not aware of significant 
internet or broadcast coverage about many local bond issues, although there are some 
radio and even television ads for high stakes initiatives in large cities, and we anticipate 
that internet will play an increasingly influential role in future campaigns.  Third, the 
focus on newspapers will bias our analysis only if newspaper coverage is significantly 
different from or less or more common than other forms of media coverage, and we have 
no reason to believe that is the case, at least with respect to broadcast advertisements.  
Internet is too new a medium to play a large role in our case studies, but it will need to be 
considered in future analyses. 
 Experimental evidence illuminates how a newspaper source’s credibility affects 
learning, and therefore allows us to draw conclusions about the conditions in which 
speakers in a newspaper story are likely to be credible and able to facilitate competent 
choices.  In a typical newspaper story, two of the key aspects that affect learning are the 
credibility of the speaker quoted in the story and the reputation of the newspaper that 
published the story.64  Druckman demonstrates how a speaker’s credibility affects 
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learning by assessing how statements from either Colin Powell (credible) or Jerry 
Springer (not credible) affect subjects’ beliefs and how stories published in the New York 
Times (credible) have a different effect than stories published in the National Enquirer 
(not credible).  He finds that statements coming from the non-credible speaker and the 
non-credible source have little or no effect on beliefs, but that statements from credible 
sources can influence beliefs.  These results imply that observer’s perceptions of a 
statement’s credibility will affect whether or not learning occurs as a result of their 
statements.  This result is consistent with the prior description about the conditions for 
learning because the voter must believe that Colin Powell and the New York Times would 
suffer some cost if they lied – a reputation cost – whereas, Springer and the National 
Enquirer have little reputation to protect.  In practice, the conditions for learning 
(especially for trust) may not work like an on/off switch.  Rather, they may exist with 
some probability.  In that event, the receiver or observer has to decide if the conditions 
are sufficiently likely to exist so that they induce truthful statements from a speaker to his 
audience. 
 The experiment used speakers who had widely known reputations; therefore, 
subjects were likely to have pre-existing beliefs about each speaker’s credibility.  
However, in local elections the credibility of speakers may not be as broadly known as it 
was in Druckman’s experiment.  The probability of learning will be higher if the speaker 
quoted in a newspaper story is known to the audience and has a professional or political 
affiliation that can help audience members to determine the speaker’s interests and 
determine whether or not they have common or conflicting interests.  Of course, it may 
be difficult for an outsider to know whether a local speaker has widely-known reputation 
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for credibility.  Remember the endorsers included in the voter pamphlet in the 2000 
Cajon Valley election, a group which included the past president of the Mother Goose 
parade.  At first glance, that seems an obscure source designed to amuse; but she may 
well be a civic leader known to many in the community and with a concern about her 
reputation.  Determining whether a particular information environment is conducive to 
voter learning is a context-specific inquiry that depends on the identities of the listeners, 
the speakers and the institutions that shape that dialogue. 
 If newspaper readers cannot determine a speaker’s interests, then Lupia and 
McCubbins show that other institutional features can create the conditions for trust.  The 
key is whether or not the newspaper has implemented these institutions, such as costly 
action, a penalty for lying, or a threat of verification.  Costly action is often not present in 
the newspaper context; indeed, the incentives of reporters to cover both sides of a story 
and to feature conflict65 may actually lower the costs associated with making a statement 
because the newspaper seeks out speakers on all sides, which then lowers the costs 
associated with speaking.  A large advertisement in the paper may demonstrate a group’s 
willingness to spend money to communicate its endorsement of a particular side, 
although relatively low advertising rates in some local papers may not provide a strong 
signal of preferences. 
 It is possible that newspapers can impose, with some probability, a penalty for 
lying if the newspaper refuses to solicit statements from speakers known to lie.  
Similarly, the newspaper may have some mechanisms for ensuring verification.  For 
example, the newspaper could employ a fact checker for speakers’ statements.  
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Furthermore, the presence of multiple speakers in a newspaper could induce truth telling 
because another speaker, who is trustworthy because of common interests, may act to 
verify the statements of an otherwise untrustworthy speaker.  Druckman’s finding that 
voters perceived some papers as more or less credible depended in part on the likelihood 
that editors employ mechanisms of verification.  None of these institutions is required of 
a newspaper, and therefore the key to a paper’s ability to inform voters depends on the 
voters’ perceptions of whether or not the newspaper has created the conditions for trust to 
exist and whether the presence of these institutions is common knowledge among both 
speakers and readers/audience.  Local papers may have very different reputations that are 
known to those living in the jurisdiction but would be difficult for an outsider to assess.  
Knowing just the name of a paper, for example, does not reveal whether it is a reputable 
local paper with credibility and with institutions to verify statements, or a neighborhood 
rag full of gossip and rumor.  In some cases, those living in a jurisdiction may not be 
confident that a particular local paper has in place institutions designed to ensure that the 
information provided in news stories is trustworthy. 
 One important issue affecting the credibility of information contained in 
newspaper stories is whether the conditions for trust exist for the people quoted in the 
story.  Such an individual quoted in the newspaper may not be speaking only to the 
newspaper’s average reader; rather, her statement may be directed at a very specific 
person or group that is a subset of the entire newspaper readership.  The existence of 
multiple audiences to whom quoted persons may be speaking can make it difficult for 
readers to know if the conditions for trust are met by a statement in the newspaper.  Are 
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the identified speakers targeting all the newspaper’s readers, some of the newspaper’s 
readers, their own group of supporters, or an entirely different audience?  On the other 
hand, if a reader knows that some in the audience can impose penalties for lying – say, 
for example, in the case of a union president quoted in a paper that will be read closely by 
union members– then the reader can be more confident that the conditions for learning 
are present even if she is uncertain whether the newspaper verifies the accuracy of 
quotes.  The speaker cannot engage in “cheap talk” under these circumstances without 
paying a price exacted by key members in the audience.  Again, generalizations are 
difficult here, but under some conditions, learning will occur. 
 In addition to news stories, readers may attempt to learn by reading editorials or 
opinion columns.  In these cases, the speaker is either the author of the column, or, if it is 
an unsigned newspaper editorial, the identity of the speaker depends on the composition 
of the editorial board and its policies for writing editorials.  If the writer of the 
opinion/editorial is well known and has easily identified interests (which are often 
provided when the author is identified), then voters may be able to learn from the 
editorial.  However, if the writer or her organizational interests are unknown, then voters 
can only learn from the editorial if the conditions for trust are present in the newspaper.  
This will be different for each newspaper, and Druckman demonstrates that readers will 
have prior views about the truthfulness of statements in particular newspapers. 
 This discussion demonstrates that learning may occur as a result of reading stories 
in a newspaper, but it is by no means guaranteed, and it will depend on the characteristics 
of both the speaker and the newspaper.  In this way, learning from information in the 
news media is like learning from other endorsers, including public officials.  Learning 
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will not occur automatically, but it is a function of the characteristics of the information 
environment and the institutions shaping the way information is provided.  With this 
understanding of the theory of learning in politics, we can now consider the information 
environment in Los Angeles and San Francisco during particular campaigns for local 
infrastructure bonds and assess whether or not voters were likely to be able to make 
welfare-enhancing decisions in each environment. 
4. Bond Referendums Build Los Angeles 
The city of Los Angeles used ballot propositions extensively in the 1920s and 
1930s as the city built its infrastructure, particularly for water and power.66  The city has 
continued to issue infrastructure bonds, although the information environment has 
changed during the century to include, among other things, voter pamphlets.  In this 
section, we examine the information environment surrounding the elections in early and 
modern Los Angeles to determine how likely voters were to learn and make informed 
decisions.  We discover a mixed picture, with a few campaigns offering trustworthy 
endorsements, but with others providing an anemic information environment unlikely to 
result in competent voters.  We also see examples of problems we discussed earlier in this 
article, including take-it-or-leave-it offers and sequential elimination agendas in 
campaigns with skewed voter turnout. 
4.1.  Infrastructure Bonds in Early Twentieth Century Los Angeles 
 In his book Globalizing L.A., Erie recounts how different municipal authorities 
used bond propositions to generate funds for infrastructure projects in Los Angeles.  For 
example, the Port of Los Angeles was extremely successful in its ballot campaigns 
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between 1910 and 1924.  The Port put six different bonds on the ballot, and all six of 
them passed, usually with more than 80 percent of voters voting “yes.”  The turnout for 
the elections that featured these propositions ranged from 14.8 percent in 1910 to 52.1 
percent in 1924.67  The Port combined active campaigns with low levels of opposition to 
generate this record of electoral success. 
Lacking in-house precinct workers, the port relied instead on interest-
group supporters, and their well-financed campaign advertising to win 
elections.  Save for the SP (Southern Pacific), which the port began to 
court assiduously, the department, in stark contrast to the DWP (Dept. of 
Water and Power), had few potential adversaries. …  The city’s leading 
newspapers and commercial organizations enthusiastically backed the 
department’s electoral campaigns.68 
 
          As the city was building infrastructure through the use of bond propositions, those 
seeking to ensure the passage of bonds often manipulated the process to stack the odds in 
their favor.  A major objective of this strategy was to ensure that friendly voters came to 
the polls on Election Day, where they could have decisive impact because of generally 
low voter turnout.  Erie writes: 
The city council frequently colluded with departments to call special elections in 
which the electoral leverage of municipal employees could be maximized.  Of the 
harbor-bond, charter, and ordinance referenda, over 75 percent were in municipal 
elections; over half of these involved special elections.  Turnout in municipal 
elections was low; generally, fewer than one-third of Los Angeles’s registered 
voters bothered to go to the polls.  Turnout was even lower in special elections. 
City employees (numbering 13,000 on average between 1912 and 1932) could be 
a power force both in municipal-bon (72,000 average turnout) and in nonbond 
elections (107,000 average turnout) from 1906-1932.69 
  
The circumstances that Erie outlines regarding the bond elections for harbor 
infrastructure suggests that the information environment was unlikely to be conducive to 
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voter learning.  Let us assess the accuracy of this conclusion by delving deeper into some 
infrastructure campaigns during the last century and the current one. 
 In the June 5, 1923 election, L.A. voters faced six bond propositions totaling 
$61,500,000.  A harbor bond for $15,000,000 and a power bond for $35,000,000 
appeared on the ballot, as well as four smaller bond propositions.  The power bond 
appears to have generated campaigns on both sides of the issue, which, all else equal, 
should increase the opportunity for learning because there are more opportunities for an 
observer to witness a speaker’s statement that meets the conditions for trust.  
Interestingly, one of the city councilors, Mushet, voted to put the bond on the June ballot, 
even though he opposed the bond’s passage.  This is a concrete example of the difficulty 
in interpreting a vote by a city council member to place a bond on the ballot as an 
endorsement of that bond.  A review of the Los Angeles Times archives in the month 
leading up to the election reveals that the only proposition to generate any discussion was 
the power bond; therefore, it seems that only the power bond may have met the 
conditions for learning.70  One opponent, the Los Angeles Taxpayers Association, 
claimed that the city was already near its debt limit and that the bonds were unnecessary 
because $25 million was to be used for the non-existent Boulder Canyon Dam.  The 
article also listed prominent groups and people associated with the opposition campaign, 
including the Chamber of Commerce, the Los Angeles Realty Board, and the President of 
the University of Southern California.  Many newspaper readers would have known the 
economic and political interests of at least some of these groups, and together with the 
knowledge of the context of their endorsements (in a public forum like the Times with 
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certain institutional constraints to deter lying), they could accurately determine the 
relationship between the speaker and the audience and learn from this information.  In the 
June 1923 election, the power bond failed, but the other five bonds, totaling $26.5 
million, passed. 
 In November 1935’s special election, a $7.7 million bond was proposed for 
expansion of the Los Angeles Harbor.  According to a November 22, 1935 Los Angeles 
Times article, appearing four days before the election, the bond was endorsed by six of 
the county’s eight congressional representatives, and it was opposed by the California 
Taxpayer’s Association.71  Readers of the paper might have been able to recognize the 
interests of these speakers and determine if they shared interests, which would have 
allowed them to learn from some of the statements.  The endorsements by congressional 
representatives might also have provided voters partisan cues to use in their decision 
making.  The bond proposition ultimately failed.  It did garner more than a majority of 
the votes cast, but it did not achieve the two-thirds majority required.72 
 The story of these early Los Angeles elections clearly suggests that political 
actors manipulated the election process to give bond proposals the best chance of 
passage, and it demonstrates that our concerns about take-it-or-leave-it offers and 
sequential elimination agendas are more than just theoretical worries.  Our review of the 
information environment of historical L.A. bond elections suggests that some elections 
may have met the conditions for learning, while others appear not to have met the 
relevant conditions.  This suggests that we cannot make a blanket statement about the 
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information environment surrounding local infrastructure initiatives; each campaign must 
be assessed in its full context.  Further, it may be that all of these infrastructure projects 
were beneficial to society even though they may not have met the conditions for voter 
learning.  However, if voters are unable to make reasoned choices about policy, then the 
outcome of direct democracy is not a result of reasoned deliberation and decision making, 
but of chance. 
4.2  Infrastructure Bonds in Today’s Los Angeles:  Has the Information 
Environment Changed? 
 The Los Angeles story does not end in the early twentieth century; voters 
continue to face important infrastructure decisions at the polls.  In the first five years of 
the twenty-first century, Los Angeles voters have made significant decisions about 
funding infrastructure projects through ballot propositions.  Between 2000 and 2006, 
there were eight infrastructure bond measures in the City of Los Angeles, including Los 
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Los Angeles Community College District 
(LACCD).  Of the eight measures, three were for non-school infrastructure.  Measure F 
in 2000 and Measure Q in 2002, both of which passed, raised money for agencies 
concerned with public safety, including paramedics, police, and fire.  Measure O in 2004 
also passed and funded clean water and ocean, river, beach, and bay storm water cleanup.  
The other five bond propositions were all for education-related concerns, and all passed.  
Three benefited the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the other two provided 
infrastructure for the Los Angeles Community College District. 
The information environments for these eight propositions appear to vary, 
although there are some common elements.  For instance, in all eight cases, both the Los 
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Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Weekly wrote editorials that either supported or 
opposed the measures.  For voters who knew the interests of each paper’s editorial board 
and who had a sense of the reputation of the papers, this was useful information.  
Furthermore, there were multiple news stories addressing each of the measures.  These 
stories and editorials undoubtedly provided reasons why voters might vote for or against 
a proposition, as did the voter pamphlets, but the existence of reasons is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for reasoned decision making.  Instead, we survey who offered 
endorsements either in the voter pamphlets or newspaper articles and evaluate whether 
they met the conditions for trust and learning. 
In general, we found that Los Angeles Times newspaper articles and voter 
pamphlets during this time period often featured statements by credible endorsers such as 
well-known politicians and interest groups.  The Los Angeles mayor and city councilors 
usually took public positions on the bond measures, and these individuals may have met 
the conditions for trust among at least some voters.  Additionally, in 2002 there was 
opposition to the bond measures by the Howard Jarvis Taxpayer’s Association and a 
group advocating the division of Los Angeles into multiple smaller political jurisdictions.  
Both of these groups were well-known at the time, and voters may well have been able to 
learn from their statements.  In each election a variety of newspapers also offered their 
endorsements either for or against a given bond.  Taken together, it seems that during this 
time period voters had a reasonable opportunity to learn from trustworthy speakers. 
 One of the particularly interesting aspects of the bond measures passed in Los 
Angeles is the relationship between Proposition A and AA.  The LACCD sponsored 
Proposition A to raise money for the construction of new buildings, and voters passed the 
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proposition in 2001.  A few years later in 2003, the community college district proposed, 
and the voters passed, Proposition AA to complete the projects originally funded by 
Proposition A.  Of course, the money spent from Proposition A would have been wasted 
if buildings were simply left half completed, so voters were in a bind when presented 
with Proposition AA.  Voters faced a classic example of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, 
discussed above in Part 1, in both the first and second bond election.  The reversion point 
in the second election was especially unattractive, and passing a second bond measure 
may well have been the only way to get any value from the original ballot measure.  
Voters had the option of approving the bond measure and incurring further indebtedness, 
or not passing the bond and leaving many of the promised construction projects 
unfinished.  The iterated process of funding these infrastructure bonds, determined 
through a binary choice often along with other decisions on bond measures on the same 
ballot, appears remarkably similar to the sequential elimination agenda problem we 
discussed in Section 2. 
5. San Francisco, California 
 The modern information environment in San Francisco is similar to that in Los 
Angeles, and this city provides our final case study to reveal whether voters can learn 
enough to vote competently on local infrastructure ballot measures.  We will focus on 
ballot pamphlets and the information they provided about groups and individuals 
supporting or opposing a measure.  We find that sometimes sufficient trustworthy 
endorsers are present; sometimes they are not.  Moreover, the ballot pamphlets are often 
dauntingly long and dense, running to more than 1,000 pages, leading to a concern of 
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information overload.  It may be that while the necessary information is available, it is 
not provided in a format that makes voting cues accessible and salient to voters. 
In November 1966, voters in San Francisco rejected a bond proposition to spend 
$95 million for airport construction.73  The bond failed because it only garnered 66.1 
percent of the vote, falling short of the two-thirds vote requirement.  The 1966 voter 
pamphlet contained two arguments for the proposition, and a slew of public entities, 
including the local Democratic Party, endorsed its passage.  One of the statements in 
favor of the bond was submitted by the members of the Board of Supervisors, which is 
the nonpartisan governing body for the city and county of San Francisco.  This statement 
provides important information to voters, in contrast to the list provided in the ballot 
pamphlet of the votes of the supervisors concerning whether to submit the bond to a 
popular vote.  The only opposition statement came from the president of the “Home 
Owners and Tenants Protective Committee.”  This statement is unlikely to meet the 
conditions for trust:  what institutions to verify and/or punish the speaker for lying are in 
place for the leader of this group with no established reputation and little likelihood of 
repeat play in the political process?  The proponents, who were members of established 
groups and provided the cue of partisan affiliation in some cases, were likely to have met 
the conditions for trust, however, so it is possible that people could have learned from 
those endorsements. 
In November 1967, essentially the same issue was placed before the voters; this 
time the proposition passed with 68.6 percent of the vote.  There were actually fewer 
people voting in favor of the proposal in 1967, but with lower overall turnout, the 2/3 
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majority was met.  It is unclear what, if any, changes in the conditions for knowledge or 
trust had occurred between these two elections, and we suspect that differences in 
turnout, not in learning, were mainly responsible for the change in outcome.  The 
arguments for and against the proposition in the voter pamphlet were both made by 
largely the same groups and included the same endorsers. 
 A particularly interesting election for our purposes occurred in November 1977; it 
featured three different configurations of speakers and therefore three different learning 
environments for voters.  In one case, there were known speakers on one side of the bond 
and an unknown speaker on the other.  In another case, only one side was represented but 
by speakers who would likely be known.  In the third case, there were known speakers on 
both sides of the bond proposition. 
 First, arguments were presented both for and against Proposition A, which was to 
provide over $9 million for city parks.  A variety of publicly-known individuals such as 
the mayor, county supervisors, and city planners provided arguments supporting 
Proposition A.  These individuals are usually knowledgeable about bond measures and 
may also meet the conditions for trust because voters would recognize them and know if 
they had common interests and faced a penalty for lying or other institutional constraints 
to ensure truthfulness.  However, much like the airport bond in 1966, the only statement 
opposing Proposition A was made by an unaffiliated person, and there was no widely-
available information about him that would allow voters to determine if he met the 
conditions for trust and/or knowledge.  The primary difficulty was that a voter could not 
accurately assess common interests; there was no way to determine what interests this 
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unknown speaker represented.  In this case, learning relied entirely on a faith in reason, a 
faith that we believe is usually misplaced.  Furthermore, this speaker did not face a threat 
of verification or a penalty for lying, and the cost of placing a statement in the voter 
pamphlet is insufficient to generate conditions for trust.  In San Francisco, statements 
submitted to the voter pamphlet are not checked for accuracy and are simply the opinion 
of the person or group paying to submit the statement.74  The proponents’ statement in the 
voter pamphlet may have been sufficient to generate learning, however, because voters 
may have known that they either shared common (or dissimilar) interests with them, and 
they therefore could have determined whether the conditions for trust were present. 
 The voter pamphlet for a 1977 fire protection bond, Proposition B, featured no 
arguments opposing it and only one favoring it.  The argument in favor was from the 
county supervisor and the chief of the fire department who may have met the conditions 
for knowledge and trust.  The councilor no doubt knew there were constituents in the 
audience for his statements, and he might be penalized by them for lying, which could 
induce him to make truthful statements.  Voters might also have known whether they 
shared common interests with the councilor (or if he had conflicting interest, perhaps 
because he was from a different political party) and therefore could learn from the 
statement.  The fire chief was also likely to face institutional constraints imposed by other 
fire fighters that could help voters determine the chief’s interests and induce the chief to 
make trustworthy statements.  Thus, this information environment was similar to the 
previous one; the presence of a statement from an unknown speaker in the first example 
                                                                                                                                            
Propositions, http://www.sfpl.org/librarylocations/main/gic/voterpamp/votepamp.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). 
74 A description of the submission rules for 2006 can be found on page 65 of the November 2006 pamphlet, available at 
http://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdffiles/November7_2006.pdf. 
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was the equivalent to having no speaker for that side at all.  Any learning had to come 
from the endorsements provided by known speakers who faced institutional constraints 
leading to truthfulness.  We believe that it was possible for voters to cast their ballots 
competently on these measures, although the presence of known speakers on both sides is 
preferable because it increases the chance that a particular voter will be able to learn from 
someone. 
 Finally, Proposition C, asked for authorization for a bond of $90 million to fund 
airport renovations, the largest amount of spending for any measure in the 1977 election.  
Unlike the other two propositions, publicly known people and groups appeared on both 
sides of the proposition.  The proponents of the measure were publicly identifiable 
individuals who appear likely to have been knowledgeable given their roles as political 
officials such as supervisors or mayor.  Some of the opponents came from groups which 
had well-known positions and interests, such as the San Francisco Black Political Caucus 
and the San Francisco Federated Young Democrats.  We should note that some of the 
voter pamphlet arguments opposing Proposition C were written by people who were 
unaffiliated with any groups, and so their interests might be unknown to most voters.  
Because some of the endorsers on both sides of the bond were publicly-known, however, 
there was a greater possibility that a voter could have determined with whom he shared 
common interests, and the endorsers also faced a greater threat of verification with 
respect to statements in the voter pamphlet. 
 In short, the three propositions in 1977 met the conditions for learning to different 
degrees.  The campaigns that surrounded other bond measures during this period in San 
Francisco also provided environments that were conducive to voter learning.  Just as in 
Garrett/McCubbins 
When Voters Make Laws 
 
 55 
1977, the conditions for learning were enhanced by the institution of the voter pamphlet, 
which allows well known groups and individuals to present arguments.  A few voters 
could have learned from the arguments themselves, but most were more likely to learn 
from the identity of those making the statements.  Voter pamphlets are no panacea, 
however; they can present challenges for voters by providing too much information, 
including some that is not as helpful as an endorsement from a trustworthy source.  For 
example, in November 1992’s general presidential election, San Francisco voters were 
also asked to decide the fate of eleven different propositions, as well as a multitude of 
local and national political officials.  There were three propositions about local 
infrastructure, Propositions A, B and C.  Proposition A sought permission to issue $350 
million in bonds to provide loans for the reinforcement of private masonry buildings; 
Proposition B involved the issuance of $158 million in bonds for the San Bruno Jail; and 
Proposition C requested $40 million for the San Francisco Fire Department.  The voter 
pamphlet for all of these issues and offices was 1094 pages long, and it contained 
information that could provide helpful voting cues (e.g., endorsements by public 
officials) as well as worthless information (e.g., endorsements from private individuals 
unknown to virtually all voters).  A pamphlet of this length may overwhelm voters, not 
allowing them to draw out the information most helpful to them.75 
 Voter pamphlets are not the only source of information and endorsements in the 
political environment, of course, although they provide a flavor of the information that is 
likely available through other outlets.  There were also a few news stories in the San 
                                                
75 These voter pamphlets also contained information from nonpartisan officials, such as simplified ballot measure 
explanations and controller’s analyses, which played some role in the length of the pamphlets.  We discuss the value of 
such statements in Section 3.1, supra. 
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Francisco Chronicle about Proposition A leading up to the election.  In the Chronicle 
articles, the primary opposition came from churches concerned that they could not afford 
the repairs even if the bond passed because they would have to pay market rates on any 
loans they received.76  Although voters could likely have determined whether they had 
common interests with the religious institutions, it is not clear whether the statements 
were credible.  That depends on the presence of institutional constraints facing the 
churches (penalties from members if they discovered that the churches had not provided 
accurate information?) or imposed by the newspaper. 
 These examples are only a few bond measures from a universe of dozens more 
that have faced voters in San Francisco recently.  Thus, drawing general conclusions 
about the information environment in this city and the voting cues it provides is 
impossible.  These examples suggest, however, that voters sometimes have access to 
credible endorsements that can help them cast their ballots competently.  They do not 
suggest such is uniformly the case, and the examples raise the question of whether this 
information is provided in a way that allows voters to focus on the helpful and 
trustworthy information and ignore the other noise in the system. 
6. Conclusion 
 Although the use of referendums is quite common across the country to finance 
infrastructure projects, there are at least three reasons why we should be concerned with 
the welfare effects from these propositions.  First, the structure of direct democracy 
allows bonding authorities to offer voters a Hobson’s choice that can move policy toward 
the preference of the proposer and not necessarily closer to the preference of the pivotal 
                                                
76 L.A. Chung, S.F. Ballot Propositions, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 1, 1992, at 15/Z1. 
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voter.  Over time, this may lead to a situation where the size of government is far away 
from the voters’ preferences as decisions are made one-by-one, in a binary fashion.  
Moreover, government officials will act strategically to take advantage of the size or 
shape of expected voter turnout in a particular election to obtain an outcome that they 
strongly favor and that most voters may not prefer. Bonding agencies may also be able to 
gerrymander their districts to increase the probability of a bond passing, an issue that has 
largely been ignored in studying the effects of the initiative process, perhaps because it is 
a phenomenon of local government and not seen at the state level, the focus of past 
scholarship. 
 Second, the problem of overlapping local jurisdictions with bonding authority, 
together with the natural properties of the sequential nature of bond elections, creates a 
race to the polls by the myriad bonding and tax authorities.  The outcome of this process 
may lead to a highly inefficient allocation of resources, where money is borrowed and 
spent not on the projects with the greatest need, but on those that got on the ballot first.  
In addition, the aggregate effect of decisions made separately and through a “yes” or “no” 
vote between the status quo and a proposal may be far from optimal. 
 Third, voters in some, but certainly not all, local bond elections have limited 
ability to make reasoned decisions because there are few credible endorsers from whom 
they can learn.  Each of these problems alone would be cause for concern, and taken 
together they seem especially problematic for the outcomes of local bond elections.  We 
believe more empirical work is necessary, using the theoretical work we have described 
here as a framework, to provide a foundation for policy makers to propose reforms of the 
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local initiative and referendum processes to better ensure welfare-maximizing decisions 
are made by voters armed with effective voting cues. 
 If infrastructure decisions are not made by the initiative process, they must be 
made some other way, usually by some sort of legislative body, such as a city counsel, 
board of supervisors or school board. Therefore, as we think about the outcomes reached 
at the ballot box, we must compare them not with the results that might occur in some 
ideal world, but to the decisions that actual legislative institutions on the local level are 
likely to reach.  A great deal of political science literature suggests legislatures are far 
from perfect, and the challenges that face local bodies may be greater than those faced by 
state or national legislatures.  Moreover, legislative decision making may be subject to 
some of the pathologies we have identified here, such as the control of the agenda setter 
and deficiencies of credible information. 
 In general, however, the legislative process seems better equipped to deal with the 
three primary problems we identify in the direct democracy process.  First, political 
parties and individual politicians are potentially accountable if they move policy far away 
from the preferences of their supporters.  Accountability with respect to particular issues 
may be attenuated, however, because candidates are bundles of positions on issues, and 
voters may decide to support a candidate on balance, even if they disagree with her on a 
particular issue.77  Second, there are a variety of legislative institutions, such as political 
parties and committees, that control the legislative agenda and thereby help to reduce the 
sequential elimination agenda problems.  Third, legislators are likely to have access to 
relevant information or trustworthy substitutes to facilitate making welfare-enhancing 
                                                
77 See Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives, NBER Working Paper 
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decisions when they cast their votes.  On the other hand, legislators are subject to 
pressure by well-funded and organized interest groups, and the vetogates in any 
legislative process may stand in the way of beneficial change that is opposed by 
minorities with intense preferences.  We suspect that local governments face very 
different realities than those characterizing the better-studied counterparts at the state and 
federal level. 
 We do not believe that elimination of direct democracy in this realm is a realistic 
proposal because of the voters’ tendency to favor some form of direct democracy in state 
(and presumably local) decision making.78  Practically, it is very difficult to eliminate the 
initiative and referendum process once established, although we think reform of local 
direct democracy is possible, even if the voters must approve any change.  We are 
confident that the current process can be improved, perhaps by changing the way in 
which voters are presented with choices, coordinating infrastructure decisions among 
jurisdictions, providing relevant and salient information about credible endorsements so 
that voters have the cues they need, and involving the legislative body throughout the 
decision making, not just at the proposal stage.  However, we do not propose reforms 
here because they would be premature at this point in the study of local bond measures.  
We urge that any recommendations take careful account of the local environment in 
which must infrastructure and bonding decisions are made. 
                                                                                                                                            
8036 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8036. 
78 See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY:  CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 17 (Aug. 2004) ; 
Jack Citrin & Jonathan Cohen, Viewing the Recall from Above and Below, in CLICKER POLITICS:  ESSAYS ON THE 
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